Why Do REITs Repurchase Stock? Extricating the Effect of Managerial Signaling in Open Market Share Repurchase Announcements by James C. Brau & Andrew Holmes
JRER  Vol. 28  No. 1 – 2006
Why Do REITs Repurchase Stock?
Extricating the Effect of Managerial
Signaling in Open Market Share
Repurchase Announcements
Authors James C. Brau and Andrew Holmes
Abstract This paper explores the effect of stock repurchase
announcements on equity returns for publicly traded real estate
investment trusts (REITs). In addition to providing analysis of
the corporate decision to repurchase shares, the study of share
repurchases in the context of REITs provides a novel opportunity
to disentangle the impact of competing theories for the abnormal
returns observed around repurchase announcements. Prior
literature advances six hypotheses to explain the stock price
reaction associated with repurchases. Given that the theories all
predict the same stock price reaction, existing studies are unable
to disentangle the competing hypotheses. The intent of this
research is to extricate the signaling hypothesis from the
competing explanations to determine whether the managerial
signaling hypothesis is a credible explanation for the abnormal
returns observed around share repurchase announcements. After
controlling for relevant economic variables, we provide evidence
for the efﬁcacy of the managerial signaling hypothesis.
The return of operating proﬁts to shareholders lies at the core of corporate real
estate and corporate ﬁnance theory. As such, stock repurchases have been studied
extensively. Masulis (1980), Dann (1981), Vermaelen (1981, 1984), Lakonishok
and Vermaelen (1990), Comment and Jarrell (1991), and Ikenberry, Lakonishok
and Vermaelen (1995, 2000) all document positive abnormal stock price
performance around the announcement of stock repurchases for operating ﬁrms.1
The existing literature posits six hypotheses to explain these abnormal returns,
namely: (1) signaling (or information content) effects associated with ﬁrm
undervaluation; (2) agency cost (or free cash ﬂow) effects; (3) personal tax effects
associated with differential taxation of dividends and capital gains; (4) inter-
security wealth transfers stemming from leverage increases induced by
repurchases; (5) corporate tax shield effects associated with debt ﬁnancing of
repurchases; and (6) intra-security wealth transfers between tendering and non-
tendering shareholders. However, these hypothesized effects are not mutually2  Brau and Holmes
exclusive. Given that the theories all predict the same stock price reaction to
repurchase announcements, existing studies are unable to disentangle the
competing hypotheses (e.g., see Nohel and Tarhan, 1998). The purpose of the
current research is to extricate the signaling hypothesis from the competing
explanations to determine whether the managerial signaling hypothesis is a
credible explanation for the abnormal returns observed around share repurchase
announcements.
As an asset class, real estate investment trusts (REITs) possess several unique
institutional attributes that render the economic intuition sustaining most of the
competing theories irrelevant in explaining stock price reaction to repurchase
announcements. In particular, since REITs are required to distribute 95% of
income to shareholders and are exempted from federal income taxation, the impact
of hypotheses two through six (in the preceding paragraph) is called into question.
While this study empirically allows for confounding effects from the major
competing hypotheses, the expectation is that their impact will be muted in the
REIT sample when compared with an operating ﬁrm sample. Hence, investigation
of repurchase announcements by REITs provides a novel approach to isolating
the impact of signaling effects from those of the competing hypotheses. This study
is not the ﬁrst to examine REITs to evaluate the efﬁcacy of competing theories
previously documented in operating companies. Jenkins (1980) uses REITs to
analyze managerial incentive compensation plans. Allen and Sirmans (1987) study
merger wealth effects and ﬁnd positive abnormal returns for acquired ﬁrms,
concluding that the wealth gains are due to improved management of the captured
ﬁrm. Howe and Shilling (1988) examine the share price reaction of REITs to
announcements of new security offerings and conclude that the positive market
reaction is consistent with the managerial signaling hypothesis. Jaffe (1991)
theoretically models REITs to examine capital structure theory in a tax-free
environment and concludes that the value of REITs is invariant to leverage
changes. Hardin, Liano and Huang (2005) use REITs to study the efﬁciency of
pricing surrounding stock splits. The current paper advances the literature using
a similar platform by examining share repurchase announcements by REITs to
extricate the effect of managerial signaling from other hypothesized effects. The
results support the validity of the managerial signaling hypothesis as a valid
explanation for the abnormal returns observed around REIT share repurchase
announcements. Whereas the data and methodology employed do not allow
dismissal of the impact of the competing theories in other samples, the results do
provide evidence of the efﬁcacy of the managerial signaling hypothesis.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a succinct literature
review. The following sections contain information on the data sample, the
empirical methods and the results. The ﬁnal section contains concluding remarks.
 Managerial Signaling, Competing Hypotheses and REITs
The managerial signaling hypothesis is based on asymmetric information between
managers and shareholders. If management views the ﬁrm’s shares as undervalued,Why Do REITs Repurchase Stock?  3
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the announcement of a repurchase may serve to homogenize the information sets
between the two groups (Aharony and Swary, 1980; Vermaelen, 1984; Ofer
and Thakor; 1987; Healy and Palepu, 1988; and Constantinides and Grundy,
1989). The most frequent interpretation of the signaling hypothesis is that the
announcement of a repurchase program will precipitate a positive stock price
reaction. Many authors, including Dann (1981), Vermaelen (1981), Asquith and
Mullins (1986), Comment and Jarrell (1991), and Stephens and Weisbach (1998),
empirically document positive stock price reactions surrounding repurchase
announcements and offer interpretations consistent with the managerial signaling
hypothesis, as well as competing hypotheses. However, consensus on the efﬁcacy
of the signaling hypothesis is thwarted by the existence of competing hypothesis.
By focusing on REITs, the confounding inﬂuences of the non-signaling
hypotheses are avoided and, thus, a more focused assessment of the impact of
signaling is obtained. The remainder of this section discusses the other hypotheses
and assesses their relevance to REITs.2
Jensen (1986) argues that ﬁrms where management has access to signiﬁcant
amounts of free cash ﬂow incur greater agency costs (hypothesis 2). Under the
agency cost (or free cash ﬂow) hypothesis, managers with discretion over
unencumbered cash tend to over-invest in projects with negative net present value.
Hence, in studies of operating company repurchases, the reduction in agency costs
associated with the cash disbursements from stock repurchases is hypothesized to
result in a positive stock price reaction (Nohel and Tarhan, 1998). However, in
the case of REITs, the potential impact of the free cash ﬂow hypothesis is
mitigated for three reasons. First, REITs are required to pay out at least 95% of
net income to shareholders. Thus, opportunity to accumulate and misuse free cash
ﬂow is attenuated in REITs relative to other industries. Second, REITs are only
permitted to invest in the purchase, sale and maintenance of real property. Hence,
management discretion over free cash ﬂows is limited by the restrictive nature of
the possible investment opportunity set. Whereas REITs may incur agency
problems by paying too much when acquiring real assets (Hardin and Wolverton,
1999), the restrictive nature of the investment opportunity set limits value
destroying activities such as conglomerate acquisitions. Third, REITs have an
established mechanism for the distribution of free cash ﬂows—dividends.
Operating companies attempting to reduce agency costs may prefer to distribute
free cash ﬂow through repurchases rather than dividends due to the well-
documented penalties associated with future dividend reductions (Bajaj and Vijh,
1990; Kaplan and Reishus, 1990; and Denis, Denis and Sarin, 1994). However,
REIT dividend policies are fundamentally different from the constant dollar
dividend strategies common in many other industries (Wang, Erickson and Gau,
1993; and Bradley, Capozza and Seguin, 1998). Hence, while the current study
controls for possible free cash ﬂow effects in subsequent empirical tests to provide
comparability with the existing literature, intuition affords that agency costs
associated with free cash ﬂow are muted for REITs and, thus, should not be a
signiﬁcant explanatory variable in the tests.
Personal tax effects (hypothesis 3), more formally referred to as dividend
substitution effects (Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1995), are frequently4  Brau and Holmes
cited as an explanatory factor in the repurchase decision due to the differential
tax rates on dividends and capital gains. However, given the 95% payout
requirement, the expected dividends of REITs are large. Hence, REIT shareholders
either (1) constitute a pro-dividend clientele that, presumably, have the ability to
hedge the tax liability associated with cash distributions or (2) are less sensitive
to the differential tax treatment of dividends and capital gains (Pettit, 1977; and
Allen, Bernardo and Welch, 2000).3 This does not imply that REIT investors shun
capital gains, only that at the margin they are less sensitive to the differential
taxation issues that are associated with dividend income. Further, Gentry, Kemsley
and Meyer (2000) show that current dividends do not impose incremental tax
liability on REIT shareholders. As with free cash ﬂow effects, the subsequent
empirical tests control for potential personal tax effects to provide comparability
with the existing literature. As discussed in the next section, the impact of
differential taxation between dividends and capital gains is gauged by including
the tax rate differential (i.e., dividend rate minus capital gains rate) as an
explanatory variable in the empirical analysis. If REIT owners are not sensitive
to the differential, then the tax effect control variable should not be signiﬁcant.
However, if the owners of REITs truly constitute a pro-dividend clientele, then
the tax effect control will be negative since the repurchase supplants future
dividends.
The preceding three hypotheses (managerial signaling, free cash ﬂow and personal
tax effects) are the dominant theories advanced in the existing literature. The
remaining three hypotheses receive less attention. However, in order to extricate
the impact of managerial signaling, the remaining hypotheses must b e eliminated
as possible explanations for the stock price reaction to repurchase announcements.
The inter-security wealth transfer hypothesis (hypothesis 4), developed by Masulis
(1980), argues that increases in debt ﬁnancing associated with repurchases may
lead to wealth transfers from bondholders to stockholders. In a sample of operating
ﬁrms, Masulis ﬁnds no support for inter-security wealth transfer effects during
the offer period. Further, Jaffe (1991) models REITs and concludes that in a
theoretical environment, the value of REITs is invariant to leverage changes. For
REITs, inter-security wealth transfers are implausible for two reasons. First, REITs
frequently make large cash distributions through regular dividends and frequent
repurchase programs. For an inter-security wealth transfer to occur, the increase
in leverage must be unexpected. Given the frequency of large cash distributions
from REITs, rational investors will anticipate and price the frequent leverage
changes (due to the cash disgorgement) appropriately. Second, a large percentage
of REIT bonds are secured by speciﬁc assets. During the sample period,
approximately 68% of the debt issued by REITs was collateralized.4 To the extent
that capital structure changes do not affect the value of the collateral underlying
asset-backed debt, debt holders are insulated from the capital structure changes
associated with a repurchase. Thus, inter-security wealth transfers should not be
signiﬁcant for REITs.
The last two hypotheses, corporate tax shield effects (hypothesis 5) and wealth
transfers between tendering and non-tendering shareholders (hypothesis 6), canWhy Do REITs Repurchase Stock?  5
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also be dismissed when considered in the context of REITs. Since REITs are not
subject to corporate income tax, the corporate tax shield associated with debt
ﬁnancing of repurchases is obviously not pertinent. Finally, REITs usually choose
open market rather than tender offer repurchases.5 Since few REITs initiate tender
offer repurchase programs (only open market transaction is analyzed here), wealth
transfers between tendering and non-tendering shareholders are not an issue.
 Data Description, Variable Construction and Empirical
Methods
Sample Selection
The sample of 240 open market repurchase announcements is taken from Security
Data Company’s (SDC) Merger and Acquisition database for the years 1982
through 1999. The criteria for inclusion are: (1) that the transaction is classiﬁed
as an open market share repurchase by SDC, and (2) that the ﬁrm is a REIT (SIC
Code 6798). Data elements collected from the SDC ﬁles include the announcement
date, stock price four weeks before the announcement, annual operating income
of the ﬁrm for the year immediately preceding the announcement, stock price one
day before the announcement, book value of equity immediately prior to the
announcement, transaction value of the repurchase announcement, total ﬁrm assets
immediately preceding the announcement and net income for the year immediately
preceding the announcement.6 The SDC ﬁnancial variables are used to supplement
the Compustat data, when Compustat data are missing.
Next, the Standard and Poors’ Compustat database provided data on ﬁrm assets
(data item #6), operating income before depreciation (data item #13), total income
taxes (data item #16), preferred dividends (data item #19), common dividends
(data item #21), market price (data item #24), common shares outstanding (data
item #25), deferred taxes (data item #35) and common equity (data item #60)
immediately preceding the announcement.
Finally, the ﬁrm had to be listed on the University of Chicago’s Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database beginning six months before the
event period. The CRSP returns data are needed to calculate stock price
performance prior to the announcement and to conduct the event study. In all, 46
announcements are excluded from the sample due to nonmatching or missing
data on CRSP, Compustat, or SDC, resulting in a ﬁnal sample size of 194
announcements.7 Additionally, the Wilshire REIT Index historical monthly returns
were obtained from Wilshire Associates and historical federal tax rate data on
personal tax rates and capital gains rates were obtained from Citizens for Tax
Justice.8
Exhibit 1 reports the frequency of announcements and is formatted similar to Allen
and Sirmans’ (1987) Table 1. Panel A reports that over 50% of the announcements6  Brau and Holmes








Panel A: Yearly Frequency
1982 1 0.52 1 0.52
1983 0 0.00 1 0.52
1984 1 0.52 2 1.03
1985 1 0.52 3 1.55
1987 8 4.12 11 5.67
1988 1 0.52 12 6.19
1989 7 3.61 19 9.79
1990 13 6.70 32 16.49
1991 6 3.09 38 19.59
1992 10 5.15 48 24.74
1993 9 4.64 57 29.38
1994 6 3.09 63 32.47
1995 11 5.67 74 38.14
1996 7 3.61 81 41.75
1997 10 5.15 91 46.91
1998 42 21.65 133 68.56
1999 61 31.44 194 100
Panel B: Monthly Frequency
January 6 3.09 6 3.09
February 12 6.19 18 9.28
March 21 10.82 39 20.10
April 5 2.58 44 22.68
May 8 4.12 52 26.80
June 11 5.67 63 32.47
July 14 7.22 77 39.69
August 12 6.19 89 45.88
September 29 14.95 118 60.82
October 24 12.37 142 73.20
November 21 10.82 163 84.02
December 31 15.98 194 100Why Do REITs Repurchase Stock?  7
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Exhibit 1  (continued)








Panel C: Daily Frequency
Monday 42 21.65 42 21.65
Tuesday 43 22.16 85 43.81
Wednesday 41 21.13 126 64.95
Thursday 38 19.59 164 84.54
Friday 29 14.95 193 99.48
Saturday 1 0.52 194 100
Notes: The sample is drawn from the SDC’s Merger and Acquisition database and includes all
REIT open market share repurchase announcements with available CRSP data. SDC contains 240
REIT open market repurchase announcements. Forty-six of these announcements are lost due to
missing data.
occur in 1998 and 1999 and Panel B reports monthly frequency.9 To demonstrate
that the analysis is not contaminated by the day-of-the-week effect, Panel C reports
that the announcement distribution across days of the week is fairly constant, with
the most occurring on Tuesday (43) and the least on Friday (29).
Construction of Signaling Variables
Three variables were constructed to test the impact of managerial signaling. The
ﬁrst two signaling variables measure pre-announcement stock price performance.
Stephens and Weisbach (1998) posit that managers will initiate repurchase
programs to signal undervaluation ‘‘following a decline in their share price, when
their stock is more likely to be undervalued.’’ Several studies, including Dann
(1981), Vermaelen (1981), Comment and Jarrell (1991) and Ikenberry, Lakonishok
and Vermaelen (1995, 2000), offer a similar interpretation of the signaling
hypothesis for repurchases following periods of poor stock price performance.
Two variables measure the pre-announcement stock performance of the
announcing ﬁrm. First, the abnormal six-month holding period return ending 10
days before the announcement deﬁned as the cumulative daily stock return for
each ﬁrm minus the cumulative return on the CRSP equally weighted index is
used as a measure of past stock price performance.10 Second, the simple return in
the stock price over the preceding four weeks is used to capture short-term price
effects. While potentially subject to the inﬂuence of competing hypotheses,8  Brau and Holmes
Comment and Jarrell (1991) and Stephens and Weisbach (1998) ﬁnd that operating
ﬁrms performing poorly prior to the announcement have the largest positive
announcement effect and interpret this as evidence of managerial signaling.
The third signaling variable, the market-to-book equity ratio, also serves as a proxy
for undervaluation of the ﬁrm. Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (2000) posit
that ﬁrms with relatively low market-to-book values have greater potential for
undervaluation than ﬁrms with relatively high market-to-book values. The measure
is constructed here by using the product of Compustat’s most recent closing price
(data item #24) and common shares outstanding (data item #25) divided by total
common equity (data item #60). If Compustat has missing data, it was
supplemented when possible with the SDC variables, price per share and book
value per share prior to the announcement.
Construction of Control Variables
The most important control variables are for the competing hypotheses. In the
existing literature, agency effects and personal tax effects are the most frequently
offered and best-supported alternatives to the managerial signaling hypothesis.
Whereas the unique institutional attributes of REITs mitigate the logic behind the
major competing hypotheses, this intuition on the irrelevance of the agency
hypothesis is not shared by all authors. With respect to REITs and agency/free
cash ﬂow effects, Bradley, Capozza and Seguin (1998) argue that there is
discretion in free cash ﬂows despite the 95% payout rule due to depreciation
treatment. Additionally, Capozza and Seguin (1998) argue that agency costs are
pertinent in REITs due to management overspending on salaries and/or the size
of the management team. To allow for these divergent views, a control variable
to measure the degree of free cash ﬂow left to managerial discretion is included.
Further, because the tax effect hypothesis is the other major competing hypothesis
in the existing literature, a personal tax control variable is also included.
To control for personal tax effects, the spread between the maximum personal tax
rate on ordinary income and the capital gains rate at the time of the announcement
(hereafter referred to as the tax spread) is included. During the sample period
(1982–1999), the maximum ordinary income tax rate changed ﬁve times. The
maximum capital gains tax rate also changed ﬁve times, although the changes
were not synchronized.11 Assuming that REIT owners are insensitive to the form
of cash disbursements (Pettit, 1977), the stock price reaction should not be
sensitive to personal tax effects for REIT repurchases. However, if REIT
shareholders constitute a true pro-dividend clientele, then the coefﬁcient on the
tax spread variable will be negative.
To control for potential agency effects associated with free cash ﬂow (FCF), the
empirical tests include the free cash ﬂow metric proposed by Lehn and Poulsen
(1989), speciﬁcally:Why Do REITs Repurchase Stock?  9
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FCF  Operating income before depreciation
 (total income taxes  change in deferred taxes)
 gross interest expense on debt  preferred dividends
 common dividends. (1)
The Lehn and Poulsen (1989) FCF measure is designed to capture the cash subject
to management discretion. Again, free cash ﬂow effects should be muted in REITs
due to the large payouts, the restricted investment opportunity set and the
established cash disbursement mechanism. Hence, the FCF control should not be
signiﬁcant in the tests.
In order to isolate potential signaling effects, controls are provided for ﬁve
additional factors. First, movements in the REIT market are controlled for by using
the monthly return of the Wilshire REIT Index for the announcement month, as
well as one and two month lagged returns of the index. Given that the signaling
premise is based on undervaluation of the individual REIT, controlling for
movements in the REIT market is important. Second, the total assets of the ﬁrm
is included to control for size effects. For example, size effects may include well-
documented small ﬁrm effects (e.g., Banz, 1981; Fama and French; 1992; and
Barber and Lyon, 1997) or transparency factors (Ang and Brau, 2002). Larger
ﬁrms, which are generally more transparent and therefore less subject to
informational asymmetries, may react differently to repurchase announcements.
Third, as noted by Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995), the size of the
repurchase program may impact the market response. The size of the repurchase
announcement is controlled for here by including the ratio of the announced
repurchase size in dollars to the market capitalization of the ﬁrm. Fourth,
differences in dividend policy are controlled by including the dividend payment
for the preceding year. Given that REITs must pay out 95% of net income in
the form of dividends in order to maintain their tax exempt status, and given
the additional transactions cost of repurchases, substitution of repurchases for
dividends is unlikely. However, for completeness, dividend control is included in
the model. Finally, as shown in Exhibit 1, the frequency of the repurchase
announcements varies considerably over time and is clustered in 1998 and 1999.
To control for the clustering of repurchases, a ratio is included that equals the
number of announcements in a given year divided by the total number of
announcements over the sample period.12
Exhibit 2 reports the summary statistics for each explanatory variable. Panel A
reports the three signaling variables. Both the long-term (16%) and short-term
(4%) pre-announcement stock returns indicate signiﬁcant average
underperformance by the sample ﬁrms preceding the repurchase announcement.10  Brau and Holmes
Exhibit 2  Summary Statistics of Explanatory Variables for a Sample of REIT Open Market Share
Repurchase Announcements from 1982 to 1999
Explanatory Variable
Sample
Size Mean Std. Dev. t-Statistic p-value
Panel A: Signaling Variables
Six-month abnormal stock return 194 0.16 0.18 1.30 0.0001
Four-week stock return 194 0.04 0.23 2.26 0.0248
Market-to-book equity 173 1.90 1.83 13.69 0.0001
Panel B: Competing Hypotheses Control Variables
Tax spread 194 0.15 0.08 27.45 0.0001
Free cash ﬂow ($ million) 143 48.72 109.48 5.32 0.0001
Panel C: Other Relevant Control Variables
Total assets ($ million) 183 691.84 1431.90 6.54 0.0001
Transaction value ($ million) 182 37.95 66.00 7.76 0.0001
Wilshire REIT Index monthly return (%) 194 0.16 4.67 0.48 0.6306
Wilshire REIT Index 1-month lag (%) 194 1.29 4.57 3.93 0.0001
Wilshire REIT Index 2-month lag (%) 194 1.09 4.00 3.81 0.0002
Dividend payment in prior year
($ million)
194 19.01 26.53 9.98 0.0001
Repurchase frequency ratio 194 0.16 0.12 19.49 0.0001
Notes: The sample is drawn from the SDC’s Merger and Acquisition database and includes REIT
open market share repurchase announcements with available CRSP data from 1982 to 1999. The
six-month abnormal stock return is calculated for the six months beginning two weeks before the
announcement using CRSP data by subtracting the compounded CRSP equally weighted market
index from the compounded ﬁrm stock return over the same period. The four-week stock return is
calculated using SDC data and is the percentage price change in the security over the four weeks
preceding the announcement. The market-to-book equity is the ratio of the market equity value of
the ﬁrm divided by the book value of ﬁrm equity immediately preceding the announcement (from
Compustat and supplemented with SDC when missing). The tax spread is calculated as the
difference between the maximum individual tax bracket and the capital gains tax rate. Free cash
ﬂow is calculated using the Lehn and Poulsen (1989) free cash ﬂow metric. Total assets
immediately preceding the announcement are retrieved from Compustat and supplemented with
SDC data when missing. The transaction value is from SDC and relies on the publicly announced
value of the repurchase program at the time of the announcement. The Wilshire REIT index data is
obtained from Wilshire Associates. The dividend payment in the prior year is obtained from
Compustat. Finally, the repurchase frequency ratio equals the number of announcements in a
given year divided by the total number of announcements over the sample period (i.e., all 194
announcements). The t-Statistic and p-value are for the null hypothesis that the mean of the
variable in question equals zero.Why Do REITs Repurchase Stock?  11
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The average market-to-book ratio for the announcing ﬁrms is 1.90. Panel B reports
the control variables for the primary competing hypotheses, the tax spread and
the free cash ﬂow variables. The average tax spread advantage for capital gains
is 15% over the sample period and the average ﬁrm has approximately 49 million
dollars in free cash ﬂow. Finally, Panel C reports the other control variables used
in the regression model. The average ﬁrm holds $692 million in assets and
announces an average repurchase of nearly $38 million. The Wilshire REIT Index
indicates that in the contemporaneous month, REIT stock performance is not
signiﬁcantly different from zero, but in each of the two months preceding the
repurchase, REITs on average experience signiﬁcant and negative returns. Hence,
REIT managers may use repurchases to signal that their ﬁrm stands out from the
industry and is undervalued relative to other REITs.
 Empirical Methods
Abnormal returns surrounding the repurchase announcements are estimated using
standard market model event-study methodology (Brown and Warner (1980,
1985). A 21-day event window surrounding the announcement (day10 to day10)
is employed and beta is estimated by using the daily returns of the stock for the
six months prior to the beginning of the window. In the regression models, the
dependent variable is the three-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) calculated
using the day before the announcement, the announcement date, and the day
following the announcement. We chose a three-day window to allow for any
leakage preceding the announcement and for those announcements that take place
after the market closes.13
The model employed to explain the abnormal returns associated with a share
repurchase announcement is:
CAR    X  Y  Z  , (2) (1,0,1)ii i i ii
where:
i  The ith announcement;
  The intercept of the model;
,  and   Vectors of coefﬁcients;
X  Vector of the three signaling variables;
Y  Vector of the two primary competing hypotheses variables;
Z  Vector of the other control variables; and
  A random error term.12  Brau and Holmes
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Notes: The sample is drawn from the SDC’s Merger and Acquisition database and includes all REIT open market
share repurchase announcements with available CRSP data from 1982 to 1999. The sample consists of 194
announcements. Abnormal returns are calculated using standard market model event-study methodology. A 21-
day event window surrounding the announcement is used and beta is estimated using daily stock returns for the
six months prior to the beginning of the window. Day 0 is the announcement day as reported by SDC. The
vertical axis is the abnormal return in percent and the horizontal axis is the day relative to the announcement day.
 Results
Describing the Announcement Reaction: Measuring
Direction and Magnitude
Exhibit 3 graphs the daily abnormal returns. Consistent with existing studies of
operating companies, the announcement of a repurchase produces a signiﬁcant
and positive abnormal return in our sample. The abnormal return on day 1i s
also positive, likely the result of announcements made after the close of the
market. The abnormal return on day 1 is negligible.
Exhibit 4 graphs the CARs. The negative returns prior to the announcement of
the repurchase followed by the positive stock price reaction on the event date are
consistent with the undervaluation signals offered by Comment and Jarrell (1991)
and Stephens and Weisbach (1998). Speciﬁcally, the poor stock price performance
prior to the announcement may lead management to signal that the stock isWhy Do REITs Repurchase Stock?  13
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Exhibit 4  Cumulative Abnormal Returns for REITs Announcing Open Market Share Repurchases
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Notes: The sample is drawn from the SDC’s Merger and Acquisition database. The sample consists of 194
announcements. Abnormal returns are calculated using standard market model event-study methodology. A 21-
day event window surrounding the announcement is used and beta is estimated using daily stock returns for the
six months prior to the beginning of the window. Day 0 is the announcement day as reported by SDC. The
vertical axis is the cumulative abnormal return in percent and the horizontal axis is the day relative to the an-
nouncement day.
undervalued. The overall trend for the 21-day window (day 10 to day 10) is
positive.
Details of the 21-day event window are provided in Exhibits 5 and 6. Of particular
interest, Exhibit 5 reports that the daily abnormal returns are positive and
signiﬁcantly different from zero on days 0, 1 and 2. Exhibit 6 provides
additional detail on the cumulative abnormal returns. The signiﬁcantly negative
CAR from day 10 to day 2( 1.5%) is statistical evidence of under-
performance in the period immediately prior to the repurchase announcement. The
average three-day CAR used in subsequent empirical tests equals 2.3% and is
signiﬁcant beyond the .01 level. The 21-day CAR for the event window is
signiﬁcant and positive (2.07%).14
The impact of repurchase announcements in the sample is similar in magnitude
to prior studies. In a study not limited to REITs, Ikenberry, Lakonishok and
Vermaelen (1995) report a ﬁve-day CAR (day 2t od a y2) of 3.54%.14  Brau and Holmes
Exhibit 5  Event Study Abnormal Returns where Day 0 is the Announcement of an Open Market Share





Return Std. Dev. t-Stat. p-value Min. Max.
10 194 0.0082 3.47 0.03 0.9738 13.95 32.58
9 194 0.1868 3.22 0.81 0.4200 25.73 23.37
8 194 0.4905 2.25 3.03 0.0028 10.77 6.27
7 194 0.1229 2.48 0.69 0.4907 7.04 15.10
6 194 0.1977 3.07 0.90 0.3714 23.23 12.25
5 194 0.2002 2.10 1.33 0.1851 12.67 7.20
4 194 0.2026 3.17 0.89 0.3747 10.57 26.80
3 194 0.4859 3.57 1.90 0.0592 27.84 12.25
2 194 0.0834 3.07 0.38 0.7055 9.89 31.96
1 194 0.0518 2.77 0.26 0.7950 16.98 10.54
0 194 1.7670 6.38 3.86 0.0002 17.75 66.71
1 194 0.4658 3.62 1.79 0.0745 28.29 11.90
2 193 0.4723 3.10 2.12 0.0356 8.70 26.89
3 193 0.2320 2.93 1.10 0.2721 15.36 18.54
4 193 0.2102 2.30 1.27 0.2063 7.96 11.08
5 193 0.3705 2.20 2.34 0.0203 10.33 7.42
6 193 0.0289 2.01 0.20 0.8421 6.93 11.15
7 192 0.0414 2.20 0.26 0.7945 7.60 11.28
8 192 0.1163 2.16 0.75 0.4569 7.17 10.98
9 191 0.0549 2.33 0.33 0.7451 13.58 13.41
10 189 0.0559 2.28 0.34 0.7361 14.14 11.33
Notes: The sample is drawn from the SDC’ Merger and Acquisition database and includes all REIT
open market share repurchase announcements with available CRSP data from 1982 to 1999.
Abnormal returns are calculated using standard market model event-study methodology. A 21-day
event window surrounding the announcement is used and beta is estimated using daily stock
returns for the six months prior to the beginning of the window. The t-stat and p-value are for the
null hypothesis that the abnormal return or CAR for the respective day(s) equals zero.
Additionally, in a more recent study, Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (2000)
report an average abnormal return for the announcement month of 0.93% (t-Stat
 2.36) for a sample of 1,060 Toronto Stock Exchange listed ﬁrms from 1989 to
1997. Other studies such as Vermaelen (1981) and Comment and Jarrell (1991)
report similar results.Why Do REITs Repurchase Stock?  15
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Return Std. Dev. t-Stat p-value Min. Max.
CAR0,1 194 2.2328 5.86 5.31 0.0001 22.36 38.42
CAR1,0 194 1.8188 6.32 4.01 0.0001 11.10 66.04
CAR1,0,1 194 2.2845 5.53 5.75 0.0001 13.53 37.75
CAR10,2 194 1.5491 7.44 2.90 0.0042 38.16 37.26
CAR2,10 189 1.4414 6.10 3.25 0.0014 25.62 26.61
CAR 10,10 189 2.0658 11.44 2.48 0.0140 41.43 59.66
Notes: The sample is drawn from the Security Data Company’s Merger and Acquisition database
(SDC) and includes all real estate investment trust (REIT) open market share repurchase
announcements with available CRSP data from 1982 to 1999. Abnormal returns are calculated
using standard market model event-study methodology. A 21-day event window surrounding the
announcement is used and beta is estimated using daily stock returns for the six months prior to
the beginning of the window. The CARs are cumulative abnormal returns over the speciﬁed
period. The t-stat and p-value are for the null hypothesis that the abnormal return or CAR for the
respective day(s) equals zero.
The uniqueness of REITs makes the analysis of repurchase announcement stock
price effects interesting. However, the true value of investigating repurchases in
the context of REITs is the opportunity to focus on the determinants of the reaction
rather than just magnitude or direction.
Determinants of Announcement Reaction: Disentangling
the Competing Hypotheses
Exhibit 7 provides the Pearson correlation coefﬁcients for the CARs with the three
signaling variables, as well as the control variables for personal tax and free cash
ﬂow effects. Consistent with the signaling hypothesis, the six month and four
week stock price performance variables are expected to be negatively associated
with the CARs. The market-to-book ratio is expected to be negatively correlated
with the CARs since lower market-to-books imply greater potential for
undervaluation. Additionally, if the personal tax effect and free cash ﬂow
hypotheses are not applicable in a REIT sample, then the correlations of the
competing hypothesis control variables with the CARs should not be signiﬁcantly
different from zero. If the competing hypotheses are important, then the tax spread
and the free cash ﬂow controls should be signiﬁcantly correlated with the CARs.
The simple correlations conﬁrm the expectations. All three signaling variables
carry the hypothesized negative sign and are signiﬁcant at standard conﬁdence16  Brau and Holmes
Exhibit 7  Pearson Correlations of Signaling and Competing Hypotheses Variables with 3-Day CAR
Around the Announcement of an Open Market Share Repurchase by a REIT from 1982 to 1999
Explanatory Variable Pearson Correlation
Coefﬁcient p-value
for Ho: r  0 Sample Size
Six-month stock return 0.186** 0.0096 194
Four-week stock return 0.147* 0.0406 194
Market-to-book equity 0.269** 0.0003 173
Tax spread 0.067 0.3569 194
Free cash ﬂow 0.091 0.2805 143
Notes: The sample is drawn from the SDC Merger and Acquisition database (SDC) and includes
all REIT open market share repurchase announcements with available CRSP data from 1982 to
1999. The six-month abnormal stock return is calculated for the six months beginning two weeks
before the announcement using CRSP data by subtracting the compounded CRSP equally weighted
market index from the compounded ﬁrm stock return over the same period. The four-week stock
return is calculated using SDC data and is the percentage price change in the security over the
four weeks preceding the announcement. The market-to-book equity is the ratio of the market
equity value of the ﬁrm divided by the book value of ﬁrm equity immediately preceding the
announcement (from Compustat and supplemented with SDC when missing). The tax spread is
calculated as the difference between the maximum individual tax bracket and the capital gains tax
rate. Free cash ﬂow is calculated using the Lehn and Poulsen (1989) free cash ﬂow metric. The
coefﬁcient p-value is for the null hypothesis that the variable in question is not correlated with the
three-day cumulative abnormal return, consisting of day 1, day 0, and day 1.
*Signiﬁcant at the .05 level.
**Signiﬁcant at the .01 level.
levels. Additionally, the controls for personal tax effects (tax spread) and free cash
ﬂow are not signiﬁcantly different from zero.
The multivariate results are presented in Exhibit 8. The results of six regression
models are reported to explain the variation in the CARs.15 Models One through
Three contain the ﬁve general control variables plus one of the three signaling
variables. In Models 1 and 2, the six-month stock return variable and the four-
week stock return variable are both signiﬁcant and negative. Without controlling
for the impact of the competing hypotheses, the signaling variables individually
possess signiﬁcant explanatory power as determinants of the CARs. The negative
sign conﬁrms the signaling hypothesis as a motivation for repurchases. In Model
3, the market-to-book ratio is not signiﬁcantly different from zero; moreover, the
model is not signiﬁcant.
Model 4 contains all of the general control variables plus the tax spread control
variable. Model 5 contains all of the general control variables plus the free cashWhy Do REITs Repurchase Stock?  17
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Exhibit 8  Ordinary Least Squares with the Dependant Variable Equaling the 3-day CAR Surrounding the
Announcement of an Open Market Share Repurchase by a REIT from 1982 to 1999













Panel A: Signaling Variables






















































































































F-Stat 3.26*** 3.18*** 1.42 1.68 1.49 2.54***
Adj. R2 0.11 0.10 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.1218  Brau and Holmes
Exhibit 8  (continued)
Ordinary Least Squares with the Dependant Variable Equaling the 3-day CAR Surrounding the
Announcement of an Open Market Share Repurchase by a REIT from 1982 to 1999
Notes: The sample is drawn from the SDC’s Merger and Acquisition database and includes all
REIT open market share repurchases with available CRSP data from 1982 to 1999. The six-month
abnormal stock return is calculated for the six months beginning two weeks before the
announcement using CRSP data by subtracting the compounded CRSP equally weighted market
index from the compounded ﬁrm stock return over the same period. The four-week stock return is
calculated using SDC data and is the percentage price change in the security over the four weeks
preceding the announcement. The market-to-book equity is the ratio of the market equity value of
the ﬁrm divided by the book value of ﬁrm equity immediately preceding the announcement (from
Compustat and supplemented with SDC when missing). The tax spread is calculated as the
difference between the maximum individual tax bracket and the capital gains tax rate. Free cash
ﬂow is calculated using the Lehn and Poulsen (1989) free cash ﬂow metric. Total assets
immediately preceding the announcement are retrieved from Compustat and supplemented with
SDC data when missing. The transaction value is from SDC and relies on the publicly announced
value of the repurchase program at the time of the announcement. The Wilshire REIT index data is
obtained from Wilshire Associates. The dividend-to-cash ratio for the prior year is obtained from
Compustat and is standardized by the amount of cash held by the ﬁrm prior to the announcement.
Finally, the repurchase frequency ratio equals the number of announcements in a given year
divided by the total number of announcements over the sample period (i.e., all 194
announcements). Estimated coefﬁcients are reported ﬁrst, t-Statistics are below in parentheses.
*Signiﬁcant at the .05 level.
**Signiﬁcant at the .01 level.
***Signiﬁcant at the .10 level.
ﬂow control variable. Models 4 and 5 are estimated to statistically test the
signiﬁcance of the two primary competing hypotheses. For the tax spread variable,
an insigniﬁcant coefﬁcient is expected if REIT investors are truly indifferent
between dividends and capital gains. However, if REIT investors constitute a pro-
dividend clientele, then the coefﬁcient on the tax spread control should be negative
and signiﬁcant. In Model 4, the tax spread variable is negative and signiﬁcant at
the 10% level (t-Stat  1.7). Taken independently, this is evidence that the REIT
sample is not completely immune from the tax effect hypothesis. However, the R2
for the tax spread model is much lower than the R2 for the signiﬁcant signaling
hypothesis variables (.03 vs. .10 and .11) and the equation is not signiﬁcant (F-
Stat  1.68) at conventional signiﬁcance levels, thus casting doubt on the
interpretation of the variable. While there is some evidence that the tax spread
variable has some explanatory power in a model without the competing hypotheses
variables, the inclusion of the tax spread control variable in Model 6 (the full
model) should allow the signaling hypothesis to be disentangled from other effects.
If the free cash ﬂow hypothesis is not valid for REITs, then the coefﬁcient on the
free cash ﬂow control variable should not be signiﬁcantly different from zero.Why Do REITs Repurchase Stock?  19
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Indeed, Exhibit 8 (Model 5) shows that the free cash ﬂow control variable does
not possess signiﬁcant explanatory power. However, the model is again
insigniﬁcant, which confounds interpretation of the individual variables.
Despite the marginal inﬂuence of the tax spread variable, taken as a whole, the
Pearson correlations in Exhibit 7 and Models 1–5 in Exhibit 8 provide
conﬁrmation that REITs provide a signaling test that is relatively free from the
confounding effects of competing hypotheses.
Model 6 reports the results for the full set of variables including the ﬁve general
control variables, the three signaling variables, and the two control variables for
the competing hypotheses. The ﬁrst two signaling variables continue to be
signiﬁcant, although the six-month stock return is signiﬁcant at a lower conﬁdence
level than in Model 1 (10% vs. 1%). As in Model 3, the market-to-book ratio has
the predicted sign but remains insigniﬁcant. The tax spread control variable and
the free cash ﬂow control variable are insigniﬁcant in the full model indicating
that the competing hypotheses have little relevance in the REIT sample.
Additionally, the fact that the tax spread variable is not signiﬁcant in the full
model implies that its signiﬁcance in Model 4 may be due to an omitted variable
bias.
As a whole, the univariate analysis reported in Exhibit 7 and the multivariate
regression analysis presented in Exhibit 8 provide strong evidence of the efﬁcacy
of the managerial signaling argument. By eliminating and/or controlling for the
inﬂuence of the competing hypotheses, the REIT sample analysis provides a more
focused assessment of the determinants of stock price reaction to a repurchase
announcement. The impact of the signaling variables is signiﬁcant and consistent
with the managerial signaling hypothesis. Whereas the tests reported here cannot
be used to discredit the efﬁcacy of the competing hypotheses in non-REIT
samples, the results do provide compelling evidence of the validity of the
managerial signaling hypothesis as an explanation for the repurchase
announcement stock price reaction.
 Conclusion
The return of operating proﬁts to shareholders and the accompanying corporate
ﬁnance questions have been studied extensively for over 25 years. In the case of
stock repurchases, previous studies have posited six competing theories to explain
announcement reactions, including: (1) signaling (or information content) effects:
(2) agency cost (or free cash ﬂow) effects; (3) personal tax effects associated with
differential taxation of dividends and capital gains; (4) inter-security wealth
transfers stemming from leverage increases induced by repurchases; (5) corporate
tax shield effects associated with debt ﬁnancing of repurchases; and (6) intra-
security wealth transfers between tendering and non-tendering shareholders.
Attempts to disentangle the impact of the competing hypotheses have been
thwarted because all six theories predict a positive announcement response.20  Brau and Holmes
This paper assesses the stock price reaction of REIT shares to an open market
repurchase announcement. Examining repurchase announcements in the context
of REITs provides a focused assessment of the validity of the managerial signaling
hypothesis. Two variables are constructed: the six-month stock return and the four-
week stock return, to capture managerial signaling effects. Additionally, low
market-to-book ﬁrms have greater potential for undervaluation and, thus, include
market-to-book as a third signaling variable. To ensure that the empirical tests
allow for the two major non-signaling hypotheses, controls are included for
personal tax and free cash ﬂow effects.
The empirical tests conﬁrm the theoretical predictions. In both univariate and
multivariate frameworks, the signaling variables are signiﬁcantly different from
zero and possess the anticipated sign. The market-to-book ratio possesses the
anticipated sign and is signiﬁcantly correlated with the CARs in the univariate
tests, but is not robust to multivariate speciﬁcations. While the personal tax effect
control variable is signiﬁcant at the10% level in a multivariate test including only
the general control variables and the tax variable, it is not signiﬁcant in a univariate
framework or in the full model. The free cash ﬂow (agency cost) variable is not
signiﬁcant in either the univariate or multivariate frameworks. The lack of
signiﬁcance between the competing hypotheses and the announcement reaction in
the full model is consistent with the argument that the impact of the non-signaling
hypotheses is muted for REITs. With the impact of the other potential theories
mitigated, the empirical tests clearly demonstrate that managerial signaling is a
signiﬁcant determinant of the stock price reaction to an open market share
repurchase announcement.
 Endnotes
1 A sample of operating ﬁrms eliminates ﬁnancial ﬁrms, utilities, and closed-end funds.
2 The focus of this paper is to test the validity of the signaling hypothesis as an explanation
for the positive stock price reaction to repurchase announcements. There is a related
literature that deals with the issue of why a ﬁrm would choose to repurchase shares. For
example, Dittmar (2000) tests the hypothesis that ﬁrms repurchase shares to counter the
dilution from the exercise of executive stock options. While this is a plausible motivation
for the repurchase, the hypothesis does not attempt to explain or predict an
announcement stock price reaction to the repurchase.
3 Ciochetti, Craft and Shilling (2000) report that institutional owners held 53% of REIT
shares in 1998. Because of the dividend tax exclusion enjoyed by many institutional
owners, high institutional ownership in REITs may be indicative of a pro-dividend
clientele.
4 During the sample period, REITs offered $157.7 million in debt issues. Of that amount,
$107.0 million was in asset-backed securities. So 67.8% of the debt issued by the REITs
during the sample period was directly collateralized.
5 The SDC contains 260 REIT repurchase announcements from 1980 to 1999: 20 tender
offers and 240 open market repurchases.Why Do REITs Repurchase Stock?  21
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6 To allow for inﬂation effects, all data items measured in dollars are adjusted to 1999
purchasing power using the Consumer Price Index. Here ‘‘immediately’’means the most
currently available data prior to the event.
7 The study samples with replacement. In total, the sample consists of 194 announcements
by 132 REITs.
8 The authors thank Bob McIntyre for providing the tax data.
9 To insure that clustering of the observations in 1998 and 1999 does not induce bias into
the results, the subsequent OLS models are also estimated with dummy variables for
announcements in 1998 and in 1999. The results are robust to this perturbation.
10 For robustness, in unreported tests, the study uses a value-weighted index and a non-
announcing REIT index in lieu of the equally-weighted index. In addition, a two-year
pre-announcement period is used in lieu of the six-month pre-announcement period. The
results are qualitatively and signiﬁcantly robust to these perturbations.
11 The tax legislation relevant for the study includes: The Economic Recovery Tax Act or
1981, The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, The Deﬁcit Reduction Act
of 1984, The Tax Reform Act of 1986, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Acts of
1990 and 1993, and the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997.
12 As additional treatments for time clustering, a model is estimated with year dummies
and treated for heteroscedasticity using White’s (1980) correction. The results are robust
to these alternate speciﬁcations.
13 In unreported tests, the results are robust to alternate CAR measures (two-day CARs
using day 1 and day 0, as well as day 0 and day 1, the one-day AR for day 0, and
the three-day CAR for day 0, day 1 and day 2).
14 In unreported tests, the robustness of the event study was checked by using a non-
announcing REIT index over the sample period. The index includes all REITs that did
not announce a repurchase program for a year surrounding the REIT in question’s
announcement date. Thus, the REIT index is inter-temporally dynamic and security
speciﬁc in nature. All of the results reported in Exhibits 5 and 6 are qualitatively robust
and statistically signiﬁcant when the REIT index is used.
15 All variance inﬂation factors are less than two, which indicates that multicollinearity is
not a concern in the analysis.
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